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How Powerful is the North Carolina Governor?

by Thad L. Beyle

n January 10, 1981, Gov. James B. Hunt, Jr. stepped to the podium in front of the old state capitol without the encumbrance of top hat or overcoat. Moreover, Hunt did not face the remnants of an outgoing administration. In 1977, the voters of the state had amended the North Carolina Constitution to allow the governor to succeed himself. Beginning his second term, Hunt could depend on experienced cabinet members and budget officers, men and women he had placed in positions of power four years earlier. Hunt began a new administration with a head start on all previous chief executives of the state.

How does the position that Gov. Hunt now holds stack up with that position in the other 50 states? And how has the North Carolina governorship changed in the last 15 years? Answers to these two questions provide some important guideposts for understanding the rapidly growing business of state government. For unlike the colonial era and the 19th century, today's goverGov. James B. Hunt, Jr. takes the oath for a second term.

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Formal Powers

A ssessing the powers accorded a governor by state constitutions and statutes provides one means of measuring the relative strength of the 50 governors in the country. The five formal powers common to all governors are tenure, appointment, budget, organization, and veto. In the summer of 1981, I examined these five powers for all the states, using a point system for each category and

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for cumulative groupings, as a means of comparing the 50 states.

Tenure Potential. The longer a governor serves, the more likely he is to achieve his goals and have an impact on the state. The length of term and ability to succeed oneself, then, are critical determinants of a governor's power. In the original 13 states, ten governors had one-year terms, one had a two-year term, and two a three-year term. States gradually moved to either two- or four-year terms, but one-year tenures did not phase out completely until early in this century. By 1940, about the same number of states had two- and four-year terms. From 1940 to 1981, the number of states allowing the governor only a two-year term shrank drastically, from 24 to 4 (Arkansas, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont). And from 1960 to 1981, the number restricting consecutive reelection declined from 15 to 4 (Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Virginia).

To rank the states according to the governor's tenure potential, I gave more weight to four-year than to two-year terms and more to unlimited reelection possibilities than to restraints on reelection. North Carolina (four-year term, one reelection permitted) fell in the second strongest group of states (see Table 1 on pages 10-11).

Until 1977, the governor of North Carolina could not succeed himself. Not only did this limit his power in developing programs within the state, it also curtailed his effectiveness within intergovernmental circles. The governor serves on interstate bodies concerned with education, energy, growth policy, and other issues and works closely with his colleagues in the Southern and National Governors' Associations. He represents the state in meetings with the President, cabinet members, and members of Congress and negotiates with federal agencies regarding various issues, programs, and funds. Such complex relationships and activities take time to perform effectively. Further, leadership in some of these organizations provides a platform for making views known and having impact on policy directions.

Until succession passed, North Carolina shortchanged itself. Former Gov. Robert Scott (1971-75) put it this way in 1971: "North Carolina is not very effective in shaping regional and national policy as it affects our state because our state changes the team captain and key players just about the time we get the opportunity and knowhow to carry the ball and score."¹ Since his second term began in 1981, Gov. Hunt has had an advantage in intergovernmental circles that his predecessors did not enjoy. By building on the experience of a previous term, Hunt has given North Carolina a greater voice in regional and national affairs.

While succession has benefited the state, it has also helped Hunt, giving him a longer-lasting power base for developing a nationwide reputation. Of the 14 most recent states to change from one-term restriction to allowing succession, all but Pennsylvania permitted the change to apply to the incumbent governor. Put another way, the incumbent governors - including Hunt - wanted the opportunity to serve a second term. Consequently, they put their political muscle behind a succession campaign, lobbying to allow the succession amendment to include the current governor. Succession amendments proposed during previous North Carolina administrations may have failed for the very reason that they did not apply to the current governor. Hunt's insistence on having the amendment apply to himself, then, perhaps played the pivotal role in having the amendment pass. Hunt thus helped give himself the chance to serve another four years while also ensuring a stronger potential for future North Carolina governors.

The Power of Appointment. One of the first sets of decisions facing a governor-elect on the Wednesday morning in November after election is the appointment of personnel to key positions within his administration. The appointive power extends to the governor's legislative role; promises of appointments to high-level executive positions, to the state judiciary, and to more than 400 boards and commissions are often the coins spent for support of particular legislation.

To measure the governors' appointive powers, I examined the extent to which he is free to name the heads of various state agencies. Governors who can appoint officials without any other body involved are more powerful than those who must have either or both houses of the legislature confirm an appointment. And governors who only approve appointments rather than initiating them have even less appointive power. The weakest states are those in which a governor neither appoints nor approves but has a separate body do so, or where separately elected officials head agencies. Since all states have one or more officials with multiple responsibilities, and various functions or offices do not exist in some states, the actual numbers of officials considered for this analysis varied by state with a maximum of 46 offices possible.²

In appointive power, the governor of North Carolina ranked among the most powerful of the 50 chief executives, primarily because he shares this power in very few cases (see Table 1). The General Assembly appoints the members to the University of North Carolina Board of Governors and confirms the members of the Utilities Commission and the chairperson of the State Health Coordinating Council.³

Two factors kept North Carolina from ranking even higher. First, this study did not analyze the number of appointments to boards, commissions, and councils of which there are now more than 400 in the state.⁴ While the governor has to share some of these appointments with the legislature, lieutenant governor, and others, he can now appoint some 4000 people to official positions. Second, a large number of state officials are elected independently in North Carolina, and the appointments that might normally devolve to a governor in another state rest with other elected officials here.

Control Over the Budget. An executive budget, centralized under gubernatorial control, is a twentieth century response at all levels of our governmental system to the chaotic fiscal situations that existed at the turn of the century. Such a document brings together under the chief executive's control all the agency and departmental requests for legislatively appropriated funds. Sitting at the top of this process in the executive branch, a governor usually functions as chief spokesman for the budget in the legislature as well.

A governor who has full responsibility for developing the state's budget is more powerful than those who share this responsibility with others. Most states (44) do give this power solely to the governor; in only six do the governors have to share the control over the budget.

North Carolina ranked lower than almost all other states because of the structure and function of the Advisory Budget Commission (ABC), which includes 8 legislators among its 12 members and controls the overall "executive budget" presented to the General Assembly (see Table 1).5 Recent moves in the General Assembly to give legislators a say over how the governor transfers appropriated funds among budget items and how federal block grants are to be administered portend even further inroads by the legislature into the governor's budgetary power.⁶ This legislative move raises legal questions concerning the constitutional power of the North Carolina governor, who under the North Carolina Constitution, "shall prepare and recommend to the General Assembly a comprehensive budget of the anticipated revenue and proposed expenditures of the State for the ensuing fiscal period."7

While analysis of the formal budget power places North Carolina low among the 50 states, a "real-world" view of how the ABC functions reveals a more complex equation. An intermediate stage in the budget negotiations between the governor and the legislature, the ABC usually serves the interests of the governor. Because the governor's budget staff is the source of information for the Advisory Budget Commission, the ABC tends to follow a governor's lead. And because the Commission is a small 12-member group, it is easier for a governor to work with them than with the Joint Appropriations Committee (consisting of approximately half the House and half the Senate) or with the full 170-member legislature. Thus, if a governor can get what he wants through the ABC, he can usually get about 95 percent of his budget package ratified because the General Assembly looks to the legislators on the ABC for leadership in budget matters. The other five percent of the budget package consists partly of "special appropriations bills" sponsored by legislators for their local districts.

Organizational Power. Recent reforms and changes in the executive branches of state governments have given many governors "the power to create and abolish offices and to assign and reassign purposes, authorities, and duties to these offices," as political scientist Edward Flentje puts it. Almost all the states have carried out some form of functional reorganization since 1965, and 21 - including North Carolina in 1971-75 - have undertaken a comprehensive executive-branch reorganization.

To develop a comparative measure of this gubernatorial power, I considered five indicators: governor/lieutenant governor "team" elections (where these two run on a joint ticket - i.e., a

voter must choose a pair for governor and lieutenant governor, not select them separately); the number of separately elected officials; the number of departments and agencies reporting to the governor; the number of public authorities, public corporations, licensing boards, and regulatory boards; and the extent of the governor's reorganization power. I totaled the scores in each of these into a governor's organization power rating. The underlying proposition for this method was that

Succession — Better Government or Machine Politics?

In its December cover story, Tar Heel, The Magazine of North Carolina, analyzed the impact of the succession amendment, which passed in 1977, on the changing powers of the governor and legislature. Below are excerpts from that article, written by Tar Heel Staff Writer Howard Troxler and reprinted with permission of Tar Heel.

Succession was the first radical constitutional change in the governor's role in more than a century. When Hunt proposed the amendment in 1977, North Carolina was one of only seven states that did not allow governors and lieutenant governors to serve a second consecutive term. Other members of the Council of State were allowed to seek as many consecutive terms as they pleased. Hunt argued that the national trend was with him; nine states had approved succession in the previous decade, and all but one had allowed it to apply to their incumbent governors.

As a rookie governor, Hunt used his earlyterm clout to convince the legislature to place a referendum on succession on the Nov. 8, 1977 ballot. A committee of Hunt supporters called Citizens for the Right to Reject or Reelect raised \$100,000 to sell succession to an apathetic public. The committee lined up celebrities such as former New York Yankees pitcher Jim "Catfish" Hunter, a native of Hertford, to appear in prosuccession television spots. The support of Jim Holshouser, Hunt's Republican predecessor, gave the drive a bipartisan flavor. Hunt opponents were not as well organized. An opposition group formed by Gene Anderson, a chief political operative during the Holshouser administration, never got off the ground. In October, a group called Carolinians Opposed to Succession was formed by several legislators more closely allied with Lieutenant Gov. Jimmy Green than with

the greater the organizational power, the more effectively a governor could manage state government.

The North Carolina governorship fell in the "weak" category for organization power (see Table 1). The lack of a team election of the governor and lieutenant governor – coupled with the lieutenant governor's separate power base in the state Senate – reduces the governor's organizational power. In this state, a governor cannot

Hunt. Green, nominal head of the conservative wing of the Democratic Party, declared that "the people of North Carolina are going to rue the day" succession won approval. Ironically, Green became the first lieutenant governor to succeed himself under Hunt's amendment.

What have been the fruits of succession? Six principal themes emerged in conversations with dozens of political and government leaders, academics, lobbyists, and journalists.

A stronger first term: The legislature passed every major piece of legislation Hunt sought during his first term: a \$25 million primary reading program for grades 1-3, a statewide high school competency test and annual achievement tests, speedy-trial and fair-sentencing acts, a Public Staff for the N.C. Utilities Commission and, of course, the succession referendum. Previous governors have complained that their influence waned in the last two years of their terms, since they were in effect "lame ducks."

Long-term government: The eight-year Hunt administration will have twice as long to pursue its programs of economic and educational development, giving it a chance to modify and develop new programs. Explained Gary Pearce, Hunt's press secretary and a chief adviser: "A lot of what he wanted to accomplish was set up during the first term. The second term will be more of an administrative one, a carrying-out of things that have already passed the legislature." At the same time, two-term governors will have to face up to long-term problems they otherwise might have been able to avoid, such as the gas tax hike to rebuild the once-robust Highway Fund.

A firmer grip on state bureaucracy: Hunt has hired his own people for the top 800 policymaking jobs in state government, and his lieutenants have say-so over hirings and firings deep into the 50,000-employee state work force. By the end of the second term, thousands of Huntapproved workers will be firmly ensconced. The State Personnel Act protects the lower- and middle-level employees from arbitrary firings by future governors. make the lieutenant governor part of his policy and management team. They are too often competitors. In addition, eight other officials are directly elected by the voters: secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, attorney general, commissioner of agriculture, commissioner of insurance, commissioner of labor, and superintendent of public instruction. Nine other cabinet secretaries do report to the governor, but these eight officials — all with independent departments

Influence over the judiciary: Although North Carolina judges are elected, vacancies and newly created judgeships must be filled by gubernatorial appointment. In his two terms, Hunt will appoint more judges than any other governor. Already he has named a third of the state's 140 District Court judges, half of the 68 Superior Court judges, six of the 12 justices on the N.C. Court of Appeals and two of the seven justices on the N.C. Supreme Court. All but a handful have since been elected to full terms. All but one are Democrats.

Shifts in the state power structure: Succession has put the political aspirations of several candidates on hold until the incumbent leaves office. If Hunt had served only one term, both Lieutenant Gov. James C. Green and Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten would have been likely candidates for his job in 1980. House Speaker Carl J. Stewart would have been a shoo-in for lieutenant governor in 1980. Instead, he lost to Green, who, like Hunt, was allowed to seek a second term under the succession amendment.

Candidates who once might have run for statewide office now may be more inclined to run for Congress. That might give North Carolina a more experienced, stronger representation in Washington. On the other hand, long-term incumbents could stunt the natural development of new political leadership in the ruling party in the words of former Governor Robert Scott, put a "cap" on new leadership.

National involvement: In his second term, Hunt has become increasingly involved in national political affairs. He heads the Democratic National Committee's task force on reform of the primary election system. He has been active in the National Governors Association as chairman of its human resources committee, and he is now a ranking member of the Southern Governors Conference.

Those who believe Hunt has the best interests of the state at heart think that succession has made for better government. Those who believe Hunt only cares about his own political future think that succession has made for machine under them – function outside the governor's organizational control.

In the early 1970s, Governor Scott undertook a comprehensive reorganization of the executive branch departments under his direct control. This resulted in a fewer number of executive agencies reporting to the governor, making the administrative branch more manageable. At the same time, voters gave the N.C. governor broad constitutional powers to allocate agencies' "func-


politics.

Hunt, for his part, maintains succession allows him to apply his first-term experience towards second-term problems. "The additional experience means that you see far more clearly what the future requires of the governor," Hunt explained in an interview. "An example of that might be some of the things we dedicated ourselves to in the legislature this year - not necessarily popular kinds of things, things that a first-term governor would not normally go after." For instance, Hunt points to his successful push this year for a \$24 million appropriation for the N.C. Microelectronics Center, a facility he believes will lure the silicon chip industry to North Carolina. Hunt argues that his firstterm work in economic development laid the foundation for his second-term emphasis on microelectronics.

"There's transportation as well," Hunt continued, referring to his successful drive this spring for a 3-cents-a-gallon fuel tax increase to fund highway construction. "A first-term governor wouldn't have done that. He would have put it off and let the next governor worry about it. I had enough experience in trying to build the economy of the state to know that we absolutely had to keep our transportation system strong. It was very difficult and unpopular, but it was necessary."

Holshouser, whose Republican administration was a case study in the erosion of gubernatorial power by a Democratic legislature, was so sure that Hunt could not win re-election that he flatly predicted as much during the succession debate in 1977. Succession, he pointed out, would give the GOP challenger a record to run against. Now, Holshouser says it's too early to assess all the effects of succession, since Hunt's record in office is all there is to go by.

"I think it's going to take more than one term to evaluate it, and if it doesn't work, you can always repeal it," Holshouser stated. "But it takes more than one time around to test it and see. It's going to take some getting used to, like all new things." \Box



tions, powers, and duties...as...necessary for efficient administration."⁸ While the number of agencies reporting to the governor has been reduced, the number of new boards, commissions, and councils has greatly increased, thereby diluting some of the control that might have been gained through reorganization. Thus, despite the broad constitutional powers of administrative reorganization, the North Carolina governor rated "weak" in this category.

Veto Power. The most direct power a governor can exercise vis-à-vis the legislature is the threat and the use of a veto. The type of veto power extended to governors ranges from total-bill veto, to item veto, to item reduction power, to no veto. Only one state has no veto power — North Carolina.

In addition to giving a governor direct power over the legislature, a veto also provides a governor with some administrative powers. For example, it gives him the ability to stop agencies from gaining support in the legislature for an "end run" around his or his budget office's adverse decision. This is especially true in the 43 states where the governor can veto particular items in an agency's budget without overturning the entire bill.

To rank the states for veto power, I made two principal assumptions: 1) an item veto gives a governor more power than does a general veto; and 2) the larger the legislative vote needed to override a governor's veto, the stronger the veto power. In

Photo courtesy of the N.C. State Archives

The first meeting on June 26, 1972, of Gov. Robert Scott and his cabinet after a comprehensive executive branch reorganization.

this category, North Carolina, with no veto power at all, ranked dead last of all the 50 states (see Table 1).

Summary of Formal Powers. To compare the formal powers of the 50 governors, I obtained an overall average score for each state using a twostep method. First, I gave zero to five points to each state in each of the five areas – tenure, appointment, budget, organization, and veto (see the footnotes to Table 1 for an explanation of the scoring system for each category). Second, I totaled the score for the five categories and divided by five to get overall average scores, which ranged from 4.8 (New York) to 2.0 (South Carolina). With a score of 2.8, North Carolina along with five other states, fell in the bottom group of states – "weak" governor. No state fell in the "very weak" category.

Informal Powers

T hese formal indicators only tell us part of the story of gubernatorial power. They emphasize the degree of control the governor has over the executive branch and his relationship with the legislature. They do not, however, measure the many informal sources of power or constraints on

a governor such as political parties, interest groups, media, money, county campaign organization, good looks, and charisma. A media-wise governor can, for example, dominate a state's political and policy agenda.

Some of the informal powers available to the N.C. governor outweigh the constraints on his formal powers. A strong media base in the state provides the governor with a major vehicle to command attention. Because no large urban area dominates the state's politics, there are no other highly-visible political leaders with which the governor has to compete. In contrast, the mayors of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other large cities have a political base which can vault them into a position to vie with a governor for leadership. Moreover, in this state few other institutions provide leaders a base for political attention. Labor unions are weak; no independent citizens group has the power to challenge the governor on any sustained basis; and the dominant industries, like textiles or banking, usually work quietly behind the political scene.

Finally, a North Carolina governor, as Gov. Hunt has proved, can still forge a grassroots political organization from Manteo to Murphy. The state is not so big as to make this process impossible, yet it is large enough to make such a countyby-county structure powerful indeed. Because the North Carolina governor can appoint judges and pave highways — the power of "robes and roads" — he can attract campaign workers and financing, essential ingredients for a grassroots network of supporters.

Summary

To place this analysis in a regional perspective, Table 1 presents the comparative formal powers of governors for the states in the Southern Governors' Association. Southern governors do not generally have as much formal power as do non-southern governors. Moreover, North Carolina has not kept pace with its neighbors in enhancing its governor's powers. While the N.C. governor gained power through the major executive branch reorganization of the early 1970s and the succession amendment of 1977, he still has to share the budget power with legislators on the ABC, to contend with a large number of separately-elected state officials, and to cope with the legislature without any veto power.

The wide range of informal powers available to the North Carolina governor tends to balance the structural weaknesses in tenure, appointment, budget, organization, and veto. And the way in which the governor uses the formal powers in a day-to-day functional sense — with the Advisory Budget Commission, for example – can determine to a large extent how powerful he really is. In the final analysis, then, the degree of power that the North Carolina governor has today depends upon the person who occupies the gingerbread mansion on Blount Street – his political skills, instincts, ideals, and ambitions. And the longer one person can maintain that residence, the greater power a governor can accumulate. So far, only one person has been able to move in for an eight-year stay.

FOOTNOTES

¹Robert L. Farb, Report on the Proposed Gubernatorial Succession Amendment, 1977 (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, 1977), p. 5.

²The 46 functions and offices are: adjutant general, administration, agriculture, attorney general, banking, budget, civil rights, commerce, community affairs, consumer affairs, corrections, data processing, disaster preparedness, education (chief state school officer), higher education, elections administration, employment services, energy resources, finance, general services, health, highway patrol, highways, historic preservation, industrial development, insurance, labor and industrial relations, licensing, mental health, natural resources, parks and recreation, personnel, planning, post audit, pre audit, public library, public utility regulation, purchasing, secretary of state, social services, solid waste, taxation, tourism, transportation, treasurer, welfare. All states have one or more officials with multiple responsibilities, and some states indicate no such function or office exists. Consequently, the actual number of functions and offices vary.

³G.S. 116-6, G.S. 62-10, and P.L. 96-79, Section 124, respectively.

⁴The North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research will soon publish a comprehensive analysis of the more than 400 boards, commissions, and councils that exist.

⁵See The Advisory Budget Commission – Not as Simple as ABC, North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research, 1980.

⁶These provisions were passed as part of the Appropriations Act in the October 5-10 budget session of the General Assembly, Chapter 1127 of the 1981 session laws (HB 1392), Sections 62-77.

 7 Article III, Section 5(3), Constitution of North Carolina.

⁸"Administrative reorganization. The General Assembly shall prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State and may alter them from time to time, but the Governor may make such changes in the allocation of offices and agencies and in the allocation of those functions, powers, and duties as he considers necessary for efficient administration. If those changes affect existing law, they shall be set forth in executive orders, which shall be submitted to the General Assembly not later than the sixtieth calendar day of its session, and shall become effective and shall have the force of law upon adjournment sine die of the session, unless specifically disapproved by resolution of either house of the General Assembly or specifically modified by joint resolution of both houses of the General Assembly." Article III, Section 5(10) of the Constitution of North Carolina.

Very Strong	<u>Tenure Potent</u> Texas	<u>tial^b</u> (18)	<u>Appointive Powers</u> North Carolina (9)	Budget-M Alabama Arkansas Delaware Florida Georgia Kentucky Maryland	aking Power ^d Missouri Oklahoma Tennessee Virginia West Virginia (44)
Strong	Alabama Delaware Florida Georgia Louisiana Maryland Missouri North Carolina	Oklahoma South Carolina Tennessee West Virginia	Arkansas Delaware Kentucky Louisiana Maryland Tennessee Virginia (16)	Louisi	
Moderate	Kentucky Mississipp Virginia		Alabama West Virginia (11)	North	Carolina (1)
Weak	Arkansas	; (4)	Georgia Mississippi Oklahoma (6)		(0)
Very Weak			Florida Missouri South Carolina Texas	Mississ South Texas	Carolina
None		(0)	(8)		(3)

TABLE 1. FORMAL POWERS OF SOUTHERN GOVERNORS: A COMPARISON^a

10 N.C. INSIGHT

Organization Power ^e	Veto Powerf	Overall Formal Powers ^g		
Maryland (7)	Delaware Florida Georgia Louisiana Maryland Mississippi Missouri Oklahoma (29)	Maryland (8)		
(1)	(29)			
Missouri Virginia	Alabama Arkansas Kentucky Tennesseee West Virginia	Delaware Tennessee		
(9)	(5)	(15)		
Delaware Florida Tennessee	South Carolina Texas Virginia	Alabama Arkansas Florida Georgia Kentucky Louisiana Missouri Oklahoma Virginia West Virginia		
(13)	(9)	(21)		
Arkansas Georgia Kentucky North Carolina West Virginia (12)	(5)	Mississippi North Carolina South Carolina Texas (6)		
Alabama Louisiana Mississippi Oklahoma South Carolina Texas				
(9)	(1)	(0)		
North Carolina				
(0)	(1)	(0)		

FOOTNOTES TO TABLE

^a The states included in this table are members of the Southern Governors' Association. The numbers in parentheses are the number of the 50 states falling into that category. Using a point system ranging from five to zero. I grouped the states into six categories: Very Strong (VS) - five points; Strong (S) - four; Moderate (M) - three; Weak (W) - two; Very Weak (VW) - one; and None (N) - zero. Sources are The Book of the States, 1980-81 and earlier editions; State Government Organization (1980); and various issues of State Government News - all publications of the Council of State Governments

^b Tenure Potential.

- VS 4 year term, reelection allowed;
- S 4 year term, one reelection permitted;
- M 4 year term, no reelection permitted:
- W 2 year term, reelection allowed;
- VW 2 year term, one reelection permitted; and
 - N 2 year term, no reelection permitted.

^c Appointment Power. I used a prorated formula for appointments of up to a maximum of 46 functions.

- VS governor appoints alone;
 - S governor appoints and one house must confirm;
- M governor appoints and both houses must confirm;
- W appointment by department director with governor's approval;
- VW appointed by department director, board, legislature, or by civil service;
 - N popularly elected by people.

^d Budget Making Power.

- VS governor has full responsibility; S governor shares responsibility with civil servant or with a person appointed by someone else:
- M governor shares responsibility with legislature:
- W governor shares responsibility with another popularly elected official;
- VW governor shares responsibility with several others with independent sources of strength.

^eOrganization Power. A composite measure based on governor-lieutenant governor electoral relationship; the number of separately elected officials; the number of departments and agencies reporting to the governor; the number of public authorities, public corporations, licensing boards, and regulatory boards in state government; and the extent of the governor's ability to initiate executive branch reorganization.

^f Veto Power.

- VS item veto with three-fifths of legislature needed to override;
 - S item veto with majority of legislature needed to override;
- M item veto with majority of members of legislature present needed to override;
- W no item yeto but special majority of legislature needed to override;
- VW no item veto with simple legislative majority needed to override:
 - N no veto of any kind.

gOverall Formal Powers. I determined the overall ratings by averaging the scores for the five categories and grouping the states as follows: Very Strong 4.5 - 5.0; Strong 4.0 - 4.4; Moderate 3.0 - 3.9; Weak 2.0 - 2.9; Very Weak 1.0 - 1.9; and None 0. - .9.